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ESSAY
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF TAKEOVERS:
THOUGHTS ON HARMONIZING THE
EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ENVIRONMENT
RONALD J GILSON*
INTRODUCTION
E CONOMIC policy debate in the United States during the 1980s fo-
cused on the dynamics of bidder and target tactics in hostile take-
overs. Confronted with the largest transactions in business history,
financial economists took advantage of developments in econometric
techniques to conduct virtually real time studies of the impact on firm
value of each new bidder tactic and target defense.' For courts and law-
yers, hostile takeovers subjected standard features of corporate law to the
equivalent of a stress x-ray, revealing previously undetected doctrinal
cracks. Congress held seemingly endless hearings on the subject,
although managing to enact only relatively innocuous tax penalties on
particular defensive tactics the public found especially offensive.2 State
legislatures, closer to the political action, acted more substantively, if less
wisely. Whether or not takeovers created new wealth they did result in
its transfer, and at least one of the parties from whom wealth was trans-
ferred-target management-had remarkable influence in state legisla-
tures.3 When labor also came actively to oppose hostile takeovers, the
coalition was virtually unstoppable. The decade saw some thirty-four
states pass more than sixty-five major laws restricting corporate take-
overs, including states discouraging partial offers and front-end loaded
offers.'
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University and Pro-
fessor of Law, Columbia University. A lecture based on this Essay was given as part of
the John M. Olin Lecture Series, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to William Bishop,
John Coffee, Jeffrey Gordon, Joseph Grundfest, Tim Jenkinson, Colin Mayer, Charles
Sabel, Myron Scholes and to participants at the Brussels Take-over Symposium, the Eu-
ropean Science Foundation Workshop on Corporate Control and Corporate Restructur-
ing, and the New York University School of Law Faculty Workshop, for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Essay.
1. See, e.g., Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, "Poison Pill" Securitier Stock-
holder Wealth, Profitability and Ownership, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 347 (1988) (sample of 118);
M. Megan Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and Share-
holder Wealth, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 313 (1987) (sample of 44).
2. See, e.g., I.RPC. §§ 280G, 5881 (1988) (golden parachutes and greenmail).
3. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, Brookings Discussion Paper in Economics
No. 91-4 (Sept. 1991); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers." Legislation
and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457 (1988).
4. State antitakeover statutes are categorized in Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H.
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The 1980s have now closed transactionally as well as chronologically.
The first quarter of 1991 marked the lowest level of merger and acquisi-
tion activity since the first quarter of 1980.' The passing of this remarka-
ble decade invites a broader perspective, which can be helpfully thought
of as the political ecology of takeovers. An ecological perspective builds
on the proposition that phenomena are embedded in interactive sys-
tems-a rich web of mutually dependent relationships. Thus, a seem-
ingly independent event cannot be fully evaluated without understanding
how it relates to the environmental forces to which it was a response and
which, in turn, respond to it.6 What the narrow focus of the 1980s de-
bate missed was an appreciation of the complex economic corporate gov-
ernance and political environments in which hostile takeovers are
embedded. Corporate acquisitions are a response to real conditions in
the economic environment. The choice among acquisition techniques,
most importantly between friendly and hostile transactions, depends
both upon the economic motivation for the transaction and upon condi-
tions in the corporate governance environment. Finally, conditions in
the corporate governance environment are directly influenced by politics;
both what is allowed and prohibited is defined, in the first instance, by
legislation.
My goal in this article is two-fold. I begin by sketching the political
ecology of takeovers in the United States-the interaction of economics,
corporate governance and politics that shaped the experience of the
1980s. I then make a tentative effort at applying the insights gained from
an ecological perspective to the current endeavor to change dramatically
the European corporate governance environment through the harmoni-
zation of takeover and company law in the European Community. Shel-
tered by the cloak of political naivete commonly allowed those
attempting comparative analysis from a distance, I will argue that an
ecological understanding of takeovers suggests a different approach than
that reflected so far in the debate over the terms of harmonization. This
approach is based on what I term the "mutability principle."
Part I outlines a simple model of the economic function of corporate
takeovers as an equilibrating mechanism that takes effect when environ-
mental change alters the efficient boundary of the firm. Part II describes
the political ecology of takeovers in the United States during the 1980s.
Recent empirical studies are drawn upon to demonstrate how the eco-
nomic, corporate governance and political environments influence acqui-
sition techniques. Part III then draws on developments in the ecology of
Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. Fin.
Econ. 291 (1989). A recent Pennsylvania statute penalizes even those who attempt a
proxy fight and lose. The legislation subjects their profits to disgorgement for 18 months
if the proponents had a 20% stock interest. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2571-2576
(1992).
5. See Merger Deals Take A Dive, S.F. Chron., Apr. 16, 1991, at C2.
6. For economists, I suppose the comparison is between partial and general equilib-
rium analysis.
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natural systems to highlight the single dominant characteristic of the
political ecology of takeovers--constant and pervasive change. This
characteristic, in turn, suggests the mutability principle as an organizing
principle for harmonizing European takeover law. Part IV applies an
ecological perspective and the mutability principle to comment on cur-
rent efforts to harmonize European takeover law and offers a somewhat
different, albeit politically naive, approach. Part V anticipates two objec-
tions to a mutability-based approach to harmonization, namely that: (1)
the mutability principle is only the British model in disguise; and (2) that
it operates to restrict beneficial regimes of implicit contracts.
I. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS
An ecological perspective on takeovers begins with a simple model of
their economic role. This model builds on the insight, originating with
Ronald Coase7 and developed most extensively by Oliver Williamson,"
that ownership of productive assets-the efficient boundary of the firm-
is determined at any time by existing technology, both industrial and
transactional. While this approach traditionally animates explanation of
why particular transactions are undertaken within a firm rather than
across a market,9 I want to shift the inquiry slightly to focus on the loca-
tion of the asset used for the transaction and the process by which the
particular asset or activity comes to be owned or undertaken by a partic-
ular firm.' 0
The model begins in period one with the economy in organizational
equilibrium. At this stage all assets are owned by the entity that can
most efficiently use them, conditioned upon existing and expected indus-
trial technology and the transaction costs associated with shifting assets
to a different entity, or restructuring an existing entity. Between periods
one and two an unanticipated shift in technology occurs. This change
may, for example, create economies of scope between previously unre-
lated activities," or simply reduce the transaction costs of combining re-
lated activities. Corporate acquisitions occur in period two. The notion
7. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), reprinted
in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm the Market and the Law 33 (1988).
8. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985).
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. The shift is more one of emphasis than of substance. Asking whether a transac-
tion takes place within a firm or across a market is essentially identical to asking what
entity owns the asset necessary to produce the object of the transaction. If the production
assets are all owned by a single firm, the transaction takes place within a firm. If, on the
other hand, the assets necessary to produce the object are owned by more than one firm,
part of the production process will take place across a market.
11. To take a currently popular example, imagine that a technological change creates
economies of scope between the manufacture of entertainment hardware, like video cas-
sette recorders, and the production of entertainment software like movies. Sony then
acquires Columbia Pictures and Matsushita acquires MCA.
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is simply that of a dynamic market in organizational form. When tech-
nology changes the efficient boundary of the firm, a response is initiated.
From this perspective, the market for corporate control is an equili-
brating process that reshuffles ownership of assets to the entity that, as a
result of technological change, now values them more highly. Hostile
takeovers are simply a subset of corporate acquisitions in which manage-
ment of the acquiring and target companies differ about the efficient
boundary of the target firm. 2 As a stylized example of the model that is
consistent with the emerging data, imagine an equilibrium in which con-
glomerate organizations survive because of the high costs of shifting their
assets to more focused and efficient uses, including management's defense
of its empire and the difficulty of financing a challenge to take control of
such large organizations. A technological change then occurs, such as
financing becoming available to a new class of break-up entrepreneurs
who profit by brokering the movement of conglomerate assets to more
focused users.'
3
In this model, corporate acquisitions operate as a dynamic response to
environmental change. 4 Such adaptive mechanisms are a critical part of
an economic system. In their absence, the system will be at a disadvan-
tage with respect to competitors better suited to respond to changed con-
ditions. 5 Focusing on the dynamic role of corporate takeovers leads
naturally to an examination of the factors that shaped the particular pat-
tern of takeovers transpiring in the United States during the 1980s. Put
differently, what was the political ecology of takeovers?
II. THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF TAKEOVERS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE 1980s
The model of corporate takeovers as an equilibrating mechanism
12. Of course, that difference also may reflect agency problems within the target firm;
that is, target management or other stakeholders may prefer to retain the now inefficient
existing boundary of the firm to protect their rents. In that case, the firm's boundary is
determined by transactional, rather than productive, technology.
13. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Cor-
porate Specialization, Brookings Papers On Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1990, at
1 (concluding that the gains in hostile takeovers stem from splitting up diversified compa-
nies); Amar Bhide, The Causes and Consequences of Hostile Takeovers, J. Applied Corp.
Fin., Summer 1989, at 36, 52 (same); Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives
Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. Fin. 31, 47 (1990) (providing evidence consistent with the
view that "the source of bust-up gains in the 1980s is the reversal of the unrelated diversi-
fication of the 1960s and the 1970s and hostile bust-up takeovers simply undo past
conglomeration").
14. Cf Richard E. Caves, Corporate Mergers in International Economic Integration,
in European Financial Integration 136 (Alberto Giovannini & Colin Mayer eds., 1991)
(applying similar model to explain the incidence of transnational acquisitions).
15. This model need not conflict with the somewhat metaphorical characterization of
the market for corporate control as a contest between competing management teams. See
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scien-
tific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983). As presented here, technological change triggers
the contest and the management teams are merely the medium, not the message.
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posits that the character of corporate acquisitions is shaped by interac-
tions between the economic, corporate governance and political environ-
ments. First, corporate acquisitions emerge at a particular time in
response to technological changes in the economic environment. Second,
the acquisition form chosen from among those available in the corporate
governance environment, also will be influenced by the economic envi-
ronment with different techniques being better suited to different eco-
nomic changes. Finally, the political environment will influence
acquisitions by affecting the range of acquisition techniques made avail-
able in the corporate governance environment. This section reviews the
empirical support for the posited interrelations.
A. Empirical Evidence Concerning Corporate Acquisitions as a
Response to Economic Change
The most familiar account of corporate acquisitions as a response to
changes in the economic environment depicts the life cycle of the con-
glomerate in the United States. The 1960s and early 1970s saw a wave of
unrelated acquisitions by American companies that changed the face of
American business.16 From 1959 to 1974, the percentage of Fortune 500
companies with a single business dropped from 22.8% in 1959 to only
14.4% in 1974.17 In contrast, "unrelated business" companies-those
without a dominant business--dramatically increased in importance,
representing 7.3% of the Fortune 500 in 1959 and 20.7% in 1974.18
The rationales for the conglomerate strategy were varied. At the man-
agerial level, management skills were said to be generic, meaning that a
talented management team could effectively direct the operations of any
business. Thus, an acquisition strategy emerged that contemplated skill-
ful central office managers coordinating the production activities of di-
verse operating units.19
The conglomerate strategy also was justified for financial reasons. Oli-
ver Williamson saw conglomerate acquisitions as a response to an inno-
vation in organizational technology-M-form management.2" The claim
was that resource allocation among diverse activities is better carried out
internally by a central office than externally by the capital market be-
cause of savings on information costs and opportunism.2' Financial jus-
16. See. e.g., David J. Ravenscraft & F. M. Scherer, Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic
Efficiency 20-55 (1987); Malcolm S. Salter & Wolf A. Weinhold, Merger Trends and
Prospects for the 1980s, at 2-27 (Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 1980).
17. See Richard P. Rumelt, Diversification Strategy and Profitability, 3 Strategic
Mgmt. J. 359-61 (1982) (Table 1).
18. See idL
19. Malcolm S. Salter & Wolf A. Weinhold, Diversification Through Acquisition 40-
41(1979).
20. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 273-97; Oliver E. Williamson, The Modem Cor-
poration: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. Econ. Literature 1537 (1981).
21. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 273-97.
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tifications also included the benefits of portfolio diversification at the firm
level, as well as the benefits of co-insurance in the face of risky bank-
ruptcy.22 Acquisitions were an equilibrating response to this innovation.
They were a means by which the boundary of the firm was expanded to
internalize the capital market, to diversify or to coinsure.23
The organizational experiment implemented by conglomerate acquisi-
tions proved largely unsuccessful in practice. Using accounting data,
Ravenscraft and Scherer sought to measure the success of conglomerate
acquisitions directly by determining whether target company perform-
ance improves following the acquisition. Their study found that the
post-acquisition earnings of the targets in conglomerate acquisitions of
the 1960s and 1970s did not increase. 24 The promised improvement in
operating performance simply did not occur.
Other studies attempted to measure performance indirectly by examin-
ing the acquiring company's actions subsequent to the acquisition, seek-
ing to determine whether acquiring companies behaved as if their
conglomerate acquisitions were successful. Michael Porter investigated
the track record of thirty-three large United States companies' efforts at
diversification over the period from 1950 to 1975. Put simply, he found
it "dismal."25 Porter reports that when a company entered an unrelated
line of business by acquisition prior to 1975, 74.4% of the acquisitions
were subsequently divested. Kaplan and Weisbach report similar results
for a much larger sample composed of 271 acquisitions valued at more
than $100 million that occurred between 1971 and 1982. By the end of
1989, acquiring companies had divested approximately 44% of their ac-
quisitions. Strikingly, the divestiture rate was almost four times higher
when the target company was not in a business related to those of the
acquiring company.26
22. These justifications for conglomerate acquisitions are surveyed in Ronald J. Gil-
son, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 341-360 (1986); George J. Benston,
Conglomerate Mergers: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies 31-34, 45-49 (1980).
23. These motivations were reinforced by the antitrust enforcement policy of the pe-
riod which vigorously and successfully contested horizontal and vertical acquisitions but
was much less successful in blocking conglomerate mergers. See Andrei Shleifer & Rob-
ert W. Vishny, Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence and Implications, 12 Strategic
Mgmt. J., Special Issue, Winter 1991, at 51, 51, 52, 55, 58.
24. Ravenscraft & Scherer, supra note 16, at 75-122.
25. Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, 87 Harv.
Bus. Rev., May-June 1987, at 43.
26. Steven Kaplan & Michael S. Weisbach, Acquisitions and Diversification: What is
Divested and How Much Does the Stock Market Anticipate (Simon Graduate School of
Business Administration, University of Rochester Working Paper No. MERC 90-02,
1990). When the acquisition was unrelated, that is, the acquiring and target companies'
four most important lines of business did not share one three digit standard industrial
code-divestiture occurred over 58% of the time. See id. at 10. When the acquisition
was related, that is, the acquiring and target companies did share one three digit code line
of business, divestiture only occurred approximately 16% of the time. See id.
Empirical investigation also reveals that the portfolio effects of conglomerate organiza-
tion were disappointing. A survey of the literature appears in Gilson, supra note 22, at
345-52.
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By the 1980s, the market seemed to have figured out the problem.
While it is by now a familiar empirical finding that acquiring firms on
average do not earn abnormal returns in connection with an acquisi-
tion,27 a more interesting picture appears when the sample of acquiring
firms is disaggregated into those acquirors making acquisitions of related
businesses and those making conglomerate acquisitions. The related ac-
quirors earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 2.38%,
while conglomerate acquirors earned negative abnormal returns of
1.89%.28 Both the absolute difference between the experiences of the
subsamples and its statistical significance were more pronounced in the
1980s than in the 1970s.29
The failure of the conglomerate movement of the 1960s and 1970s set
the stage for the divestiture movement of the 1980s. Innovation in the
first round, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, moved assets from focused to
diversified entities. The perceived efficient boundary of the firm ex-
panded. The rediscovery of specialization in the second round moved
assets back to more focused organizations.3" The efficient boundary of
27. For surveys of the empirical literature, see Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment
in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597 (1989); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, The
Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers. Evidence from Three Decades, Fin. Mgmt.
Autumn 1989, at 12; Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Controk The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. Econ. Persp. Winter 1988 at 49, 49; Jensen & Ruback,
supra note 15.
28. Morck et al., supra note 13, at 42.
29. See id.; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 23, interpret this evidence as raising a seri-
ous question concerning market efficiency. Acquirors seem not to have been penalized
for making conglomerate acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s, and there is some evidence
that the market, in fact, rewarded such acquisitions in this period. See John G. Mat-
susaka, Takeover Motives During the Conglomerate Merger Wave (University of Southern
California Working Paper No. 91-33, 1991). How then, Shleifer and Vishny reason,
could an efficient market get it so wrong in the 1960s and 1970s, but right in the 1980s?
The analysis depends on what is meant by efficiency. While the data indicates the market
was wrong in the earlier period, it was inefficient in only what one might call a "super-
strong" form: that market price accurately predicts future values. However, the data is
not inconsistent with the more familiar concept of efficiency-that market price is the
best unbiased estimate of future values. The latter does not imply ex post accuracy.
Where the information set changes-the conglomeration theory proved wrong-prior es-
timates will turn out to have been wrong. How this relates to current debates about fads
or bubbles is unclear. Not all business strategies that turn out not to work should be
considered fads. Such an ex post test reduces the concept of fad to a tautology-what
does not work ex post must have been a fad ex ante.
30. See, eg., Bhagat et al., supra note 13, at 34-44. The authors find that two-thirds
of the hostile acquisitions of more than $50 million between 1984 and 1986 involved
either complete or nearly complete "bust-ups" of diversified companies. See id. Of the
assets divested following these acquisitions, 70% went to buyers already operating in the
relevant industry. Only 8% went to unrelated buyers.
Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns (Simon
Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester Working Paper
No. MERC 91-01, 1991), documents the reversal during the 1980s of the move toward
diversification in the 1960s. While Rumelt, supra note 17, reported a sharp drop in the
number of single business Fortune 500 firms between 1959 and 1974, Comment and Jar-
rell report that the number of single business exchange-listed firms increased from 35.6%
in 1978 to 54.3% in 1988. Comment & Jarrell, supra, at 7.
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the firm retracted. In both cases, corporate acquisitions operated as a
means by which organizational equilibrium was achieved following
innovation.
B. The Link Between the Corporate Governance and Economic
Environments: Empirical Evidence on Economic Motives for
Acquisitions and Acquisition Techniques
The conglomeration/deconglomeration story also illustrates a second
ecological interrelation-that between the change in the economic envi-
ronment to which an acquisition responds and the acquisition technique
observed within the corporate governance environment. Conglomerate
acquisitions presented no serious threat to target management regardless
of the underlying efficiency explanation. Target management was ex-
pected to continue to run the target's operations, but now with the bene-
fit of the conglomerate's central office expertise. Internalization of the
capital market through M-form organization would provide the target
company and target management better access to capital. Diversification
at the company level and the co-insurance effect would redound to the
personal benefit of target management by reducing the risk of their in-
vestment in firm-specific human capital.3 Conglomerate acquisitions
posed no hazard to target management and offered a premium for target
shareholders. It is no surprise, therefore, that virtually all conglomerate
acquisitions during this period were friendly transactions.32
It is also no surprise that the deconglomeration process was character-
ized by a very different acquisition technique. Some companies, like
many of those in the Porter and Kaplan and Weisbach samples, ulti-
mately recognized that diversification had not succeeded and voluntarily
divested their unsuccessful acquisitions. For these companies, internal
monitoring proved sufficient to identify the problem and initiate a re-
sponse. From an ecological perspective, however, the more interesting
companies were those for whom internal monitoring proved unsuccess-
ful. These were companies whose management chose to maintain the
company's expanded boundary which was "efficient" only because of the
high transaction costs of forced divestiture.
For these companies, an innovation in the capital market in the 1980s
changed the efficient boundary of the firm by lowering the barriers to
hostile takeovers, principally through the development of a widespread
market for junk bonds. As a result, would-be acquirors, who in the past
31. See Gilson, supra note 22, at 360-70. While diversification at the firm level
through conglomerate acquisitions cannot help shareholders, who can diversify on their
own, managers typically cannot diversify their human capital. Diversification at the firm
level serves this purpose for management.
32. This outcome was also affected by the fact that, until Morgan Stanley assisted
International Nickel in its 1974 offer for Electronic Storage Battery, no major investment
banking firm would assist a hostile acquiror. See Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan
598-602 (1990).
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did not have access to substantial amounts of financing, were able to se-
cure the funds to acquire and dismember a typically much larger target.
The acquisition strategy of these acquirors did not contemplate operating
the bulk of the target company's businesses themselves. Rather, the plan
was to sell off the target in pieces. Each business would go to that pur-
chaser who, because it offered the highest price, presumably could oper-
ate the business most efficiently. The proceeds of these sales would then
be used to pay down the debt incurred in the transaction. The acquiror's
function was in part brokerage-facilitating the transfer of some of the
target's businesses to other operators-and in part traditional-keeping
and operating those businesses which the acquiror believed it could im-
prove.33 A hostile takeover was necessary precisely because those com-
panies that were inclined to refocus their operations could have done so
voluntarily. Tautologically, the mechanism of a hostile takeover as a
remedy for inefficient conglomeration was necessary only when a con-
glomerate's management declined to act voluntarily. In ecological terms,
particular innovations in the economic environment, namely the recogni-
tion that conglomeration did not work and the advent of junk bond fi-
nancing, fed back into the corporate governance environment and
dictated a particular acquisition technique-the hostile takeover.
Emerging data concerning corporate acquisitions in the 1980s are con-
sistent with this story. Amar Bhide examined the motives and conse-
quences of the 47 hostile takeovers involving more than $100 million that
were attempted in 1985 and 1986, and then compared that sample to a
randomly selected control group of friendly acquisitions that occurred
over the same period.' The results showed a striking difference between
the economic motivations of the acquiror in hostile and friendly acquisi-
tions. Two-thirds of the hostile acquirors expected the bulk of the gain
from the transaction to come from restructuring the target's business,
while only 17% of the acquirors in friendly transactions had similar
plans.35 Bhide also found the predicted difference in the character of the
acquiror. In over 70% of the friendly acquisitions, the central figures in
the acquiring company were "professional managers." In contrast, over
two-thirds of the key individuals in the hostile acquisitions were a new
breed of takeover entrepreneur. 6 A similar link between the nature of
the disturbance in the economic environment and the governance tech-
nique that operates as an equilibrating mechanism also appears in a set-
ting that parallels that of the conglomerate. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
33. In Pantry Pride's acquisition of Revlon, for example, the purchase price of S1.7
billion (financed in part by $725 million in junk bonds) was partially recovered by the sale
of Revlon's prescription pharmaceutical business for $690 million, its Norcliff Thayer,
Reheis, and Beecham subsidiaries for $395 million, and its Technicon subsidiary for S300
million. See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Capitalism, 136
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 11 n.40 (1987).
34. See Bhide, supra note 13, at 41.
35. Id at 43.
36. Id. at 44.
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examined the circumstances involved when a company's poor perform-
ance leads to an internal governance response where the incumbent
board replaced operating management, as opposed to the external gov-
ernance response of a hostile takeover.37 Tracking a sample of 454 of the
1980 Fortune 500 companies over the period 1981 to 1985, the authors
conclude that an internal governance response is more likely when a
company performs poorly compared to industry competitors regardless
of the health of the industry.38 Hostile takeovers, on the other hand, are
more likely where poor performance was industry-wide.39
The pattern that emerges is one in which resort to different acquisition
techniques in the corporate governance environment is associated with
different changes in the economic environment. In particular, hostile ac-
quisitions appear to be associated with paradigm changes concerning the
nature of a target company's business.' For now, however, characteri-
zation of the link between a particular change in the economic environ-
ment and the response in the governance environment that follows is less
important than the fact that the link exists. This linkage, in turn, brings
us to the third element of the political ecology of takeovers-the political
environment.
C. The Link Between the Corporate Governance and Political
Environments: Empirical Evidence on the Politics of
Acquisition Techniques
To this point I have made three arguments: (1) that the efficient
boundary of the firm is technologically determined; (2) that corporate
acquisitions are best understood as an equilibrating response to techno-
logical changes that alter the efficient boundary of the firm; and (3) that
the particular acquisition technique employed is influenced by the char-
acter of the technological change that initiated the process. I want to
close the outline of the political ecology of takeovers by describing a fur-
ther relationship that plays an important role in the political ecology of
37. See Randall Morck et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 Am.
Econ. Rev. 842 (1989).
38. Id. at 843.
39. See id. at 852.
40. In other circumstances, the change in economic environment dictates a friendly
transaction. For example, there have been few hostile acquisitions of high technology
companies. In such companies, human capital is a critical asset. Human capital, unlike
industrial capital, is difficult to transfer. One can acquire ownership of a steel plant by
acquiring the stock of the entity which holds legal title to the plant. Acquiring talented
employees, in contrast, requires their consent. Structuring a transaction to provide target
employees the necessary incentives to transfer their human capital to the acquiror typi-
cally requires cooperation between the acquiring and target companies that is impossible
in a hostile setting. General Motors' acquisition of EDS is a good example. Creating a
separate class of GM stock as consideration for EDS employees shareholders and provid-
ing EDS employees with a put on those shares that would be lost if the shares were sold
or the employees left EDS-a structure designed to facilitate the effective transfer of the
employees' human capital-would have been very difficult in a hostile transaction.
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takeovers-that between the corporate governance and the political envi-
ronments. The point simply is that the corporate governance environ-
ment-the range of available internal and external techniques for
monitoring the performance of management and altering control over
the corporation's assets-is dramatically influenced by politics. Govern-
ance techniques are either provided, tolerated or prohibited by law,
which, in turn, is the product of the legislative process. To be sure, poli-
tics does not get the last word. Even when forces in the political environ-
ment act to restrict the availability of a particular governance technique,
the economic and corporate governance environments respond, devising
more or less effective substitutes for the restricted technique. But it
would be a serious error to suppose that the political environment has no
influence. Substitutes are rarely perfect, and the costs and delay imposed
by the political process can often cause substantial changes in the out-
come of market processes.
Mark Roe has most thoroughly mapped the interaction between poli-
tics and corporate governance, both broadly with respect to internal ver-
sus external monitoring of management and, more narrowly, with
respect to the range of available acquisition techniques. 4 Taking as his
task the explanation of the dominance in the United States of large cor-
porations characterized by "concentrated management, and dispersed,
diversified stockholders [that] shift[ ] corporate control from sharehold-
ers to managers,"'42 Roe rejects the simple Darwinian theory that "the
large public firm evolved as the efficient response to the economics of
organization."43 Noting that Japan and Germany developed successful
governance systems that center on large shareholders, typically banks,
exercising continual monitoring of management, Roe stresses the influ-
ence of politics on corporate governance. American politics, fearing the
concentration of power on Wall Street, imposed legal limits on the activi-
ties of financial intermediaries that made a Japanese or German style
system impossible. In Roe's analysis, American "[c]orporate history can
be seen as an effort to find substitutes for the direct monitoring that poli-
tics disallowed."' Put in slightly different terms, American politics dic-
41. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 10 (1991).
42. Id at 10.
43. Id.
44. Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public
Companies, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 7, 35 (1990). Some disagreement exists among commenta-
tors over which politically imposed restrictions account for the limited role of American
banks in the corporate governance environment. Roe argues that many laws contributed
to the result. See id at 9-11. Joseph Grundfest stresses the separation of commercial
and investment banking and restrictions on equity ownership by financial intermediaries.
See Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 89 (1990).
In contrast, John Coffee notes that Japanese banks operate under restrictions similar to
those in the United States, and that German banks nonetheless do not hold significantly
larger equity stakes than would be allowed under U.S. regulation, despite not being sub-
ject to comparable regulation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control" The
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tated external monitoring of corporate governance through the capital
market as opposed to internal monitoring through financial
intermediaries.45
Shifting his attention to the takeover movement of the 1980s, Roe re-
counts the managerial response to the innovation in the corporate gov-
ernance environment involving junk bond-financed bust-up takeovers
that altered the efficient boundary of the firm.46 He argues that manage-
ment "struck back in the political arena. By calling for political rein-
forcements, managers won [through enactment of antitakeover laws] in
state-by-state political combat what they could not win [from] sharehold-
ers. They won freedom, nearly complete, from takeover. '
47
As with the link between the economic and governance environments,
the emerging empirical evidence also supports a link between the polit-
ical and governance environments.48 If political action reduces the likeli-
hood of takeovers by changing corporate governance rules, enactment of
state antitakeover laws should be associated with negative abnormal re-
turns for affected firms. Alternatively, because individual corporations
can adopt their own antitakeover rules by shareholder vote, political ac-
tion may have no measurable impact on the corporate governance envi-
ronment. The data demonstrate that politics matter. The most recent
studies of state antitakeover legislation show that companies that had
adopted no firm-level defenses, presumably because shareholders would
not approve them, experienced statistically significant negative abnormal
returns of almost 4% on state enactment, companies that had previously
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1313-14 (1991).
Coffee argues that the influence of Japanese and German banks is accounted for by the
fact that a few large banks were able to meet the capital needs of business, thereby assur-
ing their influence. See id. at 1286-87. The politics of federalism in the United States,
however, favored local over money-center banks, which kept banks too small to play that
role. See Roe, supra, at 27. The difference is one of emphasis rather than direction. For
purposes of my argument, both sides agree concerning the importance of the political
environment in shaping the corporate governance and economic environments.
45. From the perspective of political ecology, politics has also influenced the Japanese
and German corporate governance environment. As Reinier Kraakman and I have
pointed out elsewhere, "which institution substitutes for which depends on your perspec-
tive." Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 879 n.56 (1991). While Roe
characterizes takeovers as a substitute for the banker model in the United States, see Roe,
supra note 41 at 37, Sheard characterizes the banker model in Japan as a "substitute I0 for
the missing takeover market in Japan." Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corpo-
rate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 399, 399 (1989). For an
interesting account of how the impact of World War II in Japan and Germany may have
disrupted the interest group politics that Roe describes, thereby creating the necessary
setting for post-war economic success, see Mancur Olson, The Rise and Fall of Nations
(1982).
46. See Roe, supra note 3, at 13-16.
47. Id. at 28. Roe certainly overstates the impact of the great majority of state legis-
lation. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the legislation did have a
substantial effect on the probability of takeovers. See infra notes 49-55 and accompany-
ing text.
48. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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adopted firm-level defenses were essentially unaffected.49 As Roe sug-
gests, the outcome in the political environment trumped the outcome in
the corporate governance environment.50
From an ecological perspective, however, the interactive process does
not stop after one round. Due to a post-World War II decision to pro-
vide for retirement security in the United States primarily through pri-
vate pension funds51 and the implementation of large tax incentives
encouraging workers to use such plans as their primary savings vehicle,
by the 1980s shareholdings in large American corporations were not as
dispersed as the standard Berle and Means rhetoric assumed. While in
1950 institutional investors held approximately 8% of U.S. equities,52 by
1989 institutional investors held 50% of the equity of the fifty largest
American corporations, 53.2% of the equity of the largest hundred, and
48.1% of the equity of the largest thousand.53 These investors responded
to management efforts to protect their companies from the market for
corporate control by proffering shareholder electoral proposals seeking to
dismantle firm-level defenses and to force companies to opt out of state
antitakeover legislation.' In turn, acquiring companies altered their ac-
quisition technique by coupling a tender offer conditioned on the lower-
ing of takeover defenses with a proxy contest seeking control of the target
company's board of directors. The message to target management was
that reliance on firm level and state law takeover defenses will be futile if
target shareholders give the acquiring company control of the target
company's board.55 The electoral activism of institutional shareholders
made the threat of the new acquisition technique credible.
The history of takeovers in the United States during the 1980s illus-
trates the full range of ecological interaction. Change in the economic
environment triggered acquisition activity effected through a particular
49. See Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 4, at 308-13. A similar result has been re-
ported with respect to the recent Pennsylvania statute. See Samuel H. Szewczyk &
George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1992).
50. See Roe, supra note 3, at 28.
51. See, eg., William Graebner, A History of Retirement 215-41 (1980) (tracing the
legislative, economic and social factors that encouraged the development of private pen-
sion fimds from WWII through the 1950s).
52. See New York Stock Exchange, Institutional Investor Fact Book 1990, at 4.
53. See Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital
Markets, in Institutional Investing (Arnold W. Sametz et al., eds., 1991).
54. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 45, at 867-71. For an interesting account of
companies opting out of the Pennsylvania antitakeover statute, see John Pound, On the
Motive For Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure (Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University Working Paper, Dec. 1990) (on fie with the Fordham Law
Review).
55. AT&T's successful effort to acquire NCR followed this strategy. When NCR
strenuously resisted AT&T's offer, AT&T launched a proxy fight for control of the NCR
board, ultimately winning four board seats but not control. Following the board election,
NCR entered into discussions with AT&T, and subsequently agreed to be acquired in a
negotiated transaction. John R. Wilkie & John J. Keller, NCR Agrees to AT&T Take-
over, Wall St. J., May 7, 1991, at A3.
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transactional technique. Responsive change in the political environment
altered the corporate governance environment to restrict the availability
of this technique. This set off another round of change in the governance
environment and, ultimately, in the acquisition technique observed. Out
of this interaction, the efficient boundary of the firm emerges-a bound-
ary that is "efficient" not in an abstract sense, but conditioned on the
restraints imposed by the political system and the ecological processes
described above.
III. THE CENTRAL ECOLOGICAL FACT: THE PERVASIVENESS
OF CHANGE
Viewing the corporate takeover process through an ecological prism
has a payoff beyond parsimony of explanation. It also allows us to bring
to bear developments in the study of natural ecological systems on an
ecological system of our creation, if not of our control. This section dis-
cusses one such development-recognition of the dominance of change
over equilibrium as the normal condition of natural environments. The
centrality of environmental change emphasizes an important characteris-
tic of organizational survival, what I term the "mutability principle."
The next Section argues that both the pervasiveness of change and the
mutability principle have important implications for the shape of regula-
tory efforts to intervene in the corporate governance environment, the
most ambitious example of which is the European Community's ongoing
effort to harmonize European takeover and company law.
Study of the ecology of natural systems traditionally has been domi-
nated by the concept of a natural equilibrium-the "balance" of nature.
In this view, the normal condition of nature is a stable equilibrium. An
ecological system reacts to environmental change by responses that re-
turn the system to the pre-existing equilibrium. Some ecologists now
have begun to question whether ecological systems have such a natural
equilibrium.56 External change appears to be constant, and participants
within the system both change and react to other changes in idiosyn-
cratic ways, therefore, the state of nature is one of continuous flux. At
best, the system experiences a succession of short-lived and quite differ-
ent equilibria.57
The concept that a central characteristic of an ecological system is per-
vasive change fits well with recent experience in the system that concerns
us here-the interaction of the economic, corporate governance and
political environments related to takeovers. On the economic front, the
56. See, e.g., Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies (1990); Daniel B. Botkin et al.,
Science and the Global Environment, in Changing the Global Environment 3 (Daniel B.
Botkin et al. eds, 1989).
57. Accessible accounts of this potential paradigm shift among natural ecologists ap-
pear in recent newspaper stories. See William K. Stevens, Balance of Nature? What
Balance is That?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1991, at C4; William K. Stevens, New Eye on
Nature: The Real Constant is Eternal Turmoil, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1990, at Cl.
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very nature of product markets and the manufacturing process appears
to be changing dramatically. The post-World War II world in which a
company manufactured a small number of long-lived standardized prod-
ucts employing a production process designed to maximize scale econo-
mies is giving way to one in which the market demands a vastly larger
array of specialized products, that have dramatically shorter product cy-
cles, and whose manufacture demands a different kind of production pro-
cess and industrial organization.5" Internationalization of both the
product and capital markets has accelerated. 9 Each of these changes
has triggered responses in the corporate governance and political envi-
ronments which, in turn, have fed back into the economic environment.
It may have been difficult for natural ecologists to recognize the perva-
siveness of change in ecosystems whose cycles are long-lasting and there-
fore difficult to observe. For those of us interested in the ecology of
social systems, the insight that the natural condition of ecosystems is
change not equilibrium has the characteristic of elegance. Once said, its
accuracy is obvious. There is no stable equilibrium.
The task now is the instrumental application of that insight to guide
regulatory efforts in the political environment whose goal is to improve
the performance of organizations in the economic environment by alter-
ing the terms of the corporate governance environment. Recognition of
the pervasiveness of change suggests the mutability principle. In an envi-
ronment characterized by constant and unpredictable change, the quality
necessary for evolutionary success is mutability-an organism's ability to
alter its structure to adapt to new conditions. What we should seek is
not the optimum governance regime for the environmental conditions we
currently observe. Regulation that enshrines existing governance struc-
tures by creating transaction cost barriers to organizational change is a
poor candidate for improving long-term economic performance. The
mutability principle counsels in favor of changes in the corporate govern-
ance environment that facilitate prompt and low cost organizational re-
sponses to changes in the economic environment. This principle suggests
a very different approach to regulatory reform of corporate governance
than, at least to an outsider, appears to animate the European Commu-
nity's current efforts to harmonize takeover law.
58. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing:
Technology, Strategy and Organization, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 511 (1990); Michael J. Piore,
Corporate Reform in American Manufacturing and the Challenge to Economic Theory
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 533, 1989). For a compari-
son between American and Japanese industrial organization along these dimensions, see
Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Literature
1 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Mar-
ket" Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 349 (1990)
(analyzing the extent and composition of internalization in the world's equity securities
market in the 1980s).
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IV. HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN TAKEOVER LAW AND THE
MUTABILITY PRINCIPLE
At present, the Commission of the European Communities' Amended
Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, Concern-
ing Takeover and Other General Bids' (the "Thirteenth Directive"),
constitutes the principal effort at harmonizing European takeover law.
Focusing most intently on hostile bids, the document specifies the re-
quired terms of a takeover bid and the manner in which the bidding pro-
cess must be conducted. Most controversially, it also severely restricts
target management's ability to take defensive action after a bid has been
made. Much more limited restrictions were placed on defenses usually
adopted prior to a bid, such as dual class common stock or a ceiling on
the number of shares that can be voted by a single shareholder. Current
thoughts on pre-bid defensive behavior seem to be reflected in the Com-
mission's Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute for a European Com-
pany,6' which would not affect existing firms and would leave companies
that elect to be governed by its provisions a great deal of freedom to
adopt pre-bid defensive barriers,62 and in the second amendment to the
proposed Fifth Directive on the Structure of Public Limited
Companies.63
These efforts seem motivated by the desire to alter the European cor-
porate governance environment to encourage a corporate acquisition re-
sponse to perceived changes in the economic environment that are
believed to have changed the efficient boundary of the firm. A recent
study of obstacles to takeover bids in the European Community under-
taken on behalf of the Commission concludes that facilitating takeovers
60. 1991 O.J. (C 240) 7. The amended directive superseded the Commission's earlier
proposal of January, 1989. See Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company
Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8. For commentary
on the previous draft, see Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, Tender Offers in the European Commu-
nity: The Playing Field Shrinks, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 923 (1989); Dieter Hahn,
Takeover Rules in the European Community: An Economic Analysis of Proposed Takeover
Guidelines and Already Issued Disclosure Rules, 10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 131 (1990).
61. See Statute for a European Company, E.C. Bull. Supp. May, 1989. The distinc-
tion between pre- and post-bid defensive action is ambiguous with respect to the opera-
tion of the poison pill. Although nothing in the Thirteenth Directive prevents a potential
target company from adopting a poison pill plan prior to receipt of a takeover bid, the
plan is implemented after the bid by issuing preferred stock. Article 8(l)(a) of the Thir-
teenth Directive effectively disables poison pill plans by requiring shareholder approval to
issue any securities while a takeover bid is pending. For a discussion of the history of the
Societas Europaea project, see Richard M. Buxbaum & Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmoniza-
tion and the Business Enterprise 244-46 (1988).
62. The regulation would apply only to holding companies resulting from a merger
among companies from different member states, or to the formation of a joint subsidiary
by companies from different member states, in either case only if the parties elect its
application. See Statute for a European Company, supra note 61, at Article 2. With
respect to the defensive freedom left to electing companies, Article 92 would bar dual
class common stock but leave companies free to limit the maximum number of shares
that could be voted by a single shareholder. See id. at Article 92.
63. Second Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth Directive, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 5.
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within the European Community is required to enable "EC companies to
build the necessary scale in their new 'home market' [which] is in many
industries essential to assure EC industry competitiveness in an increas-
ingly global environment."'  Similarly, the preface to the proposal for a
Statute for a European Company lists the Statute's first purpose as "en-
abl[ing] businesses to carry out cross-frontier restructurings by means of
an international assets merger rather than merely by means of a takeover
bid."6 In general, both proposals seem to be concerned with the fact
that economic changes have increased the efficient scale of enterprise.
The announced goal is to facilitate an equilibrating response by easing
certain barriers to corporate acquisitions.6 6
The Thirteenth Directive and the Statute for a European Company
seem to reflect an uneasy balance between the two conflicting poles
within the European corporate governance environment. On the one
hand, the British governance model places the power to transfer control
of a corporation with its shareholders much more effectively than cur-
rently is the case in the United States. Under General Principle 7 of the
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, target companies are essentially
prohibited from taking defensive action once a bid is made.6' As a result,
target management's decision not to participate in a friendly acquisition
can be appealed to the shareholders by means of a hostile bid. The Brit-
ish model is clearly reflected in Article 8 of the Thirteenth Directive
which, in the words of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the
directive, "require[s] the board of the offeree company to refrain from
adopting defensive measures without the authorization of the general
meeting of shareholders."6
In contrast, the German model is commonly taken to fix control in
management, subject to ongoing monitoring by large banks.69 In Ger-
many, it is difficult for control to be accumulated or transferred through
the market because of the combination of: (1) a two-tiered board system
that insulates operating management from prompt displacement; (2)
bearer shares that serve to give the large banks voting power that far
exceeds their not insubstantial direct equity holdings; and (3) limits on
64. BoozoAllen Acquisition Services, Executive Summary, Study on Obstacles to
Takeover Bids in the European Community 12 (1989).
65. Statute for a European Company, supra note 61, at 7.
66. See Company Law Committee, the Law Society, Amendments to the Fifth Direc-
tive, Memorandum No. 253 (Apr. 1991), describing the amendments as "intended to
remove barriers to takeovers." Id at 1.
67. General Principle 7 is amplified by Rule 21, which explicitly prohibits a target
company from issuing new shares, disposing of material amounts of assets, or entering
into contracts other than in the ordinary course of business.
68. Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Thirteenth Directive, at 7.
69. See, e.g., John Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance:
The Role of West German Banks, 95 Econ. J. 118 (1985); Theodor Baums, Banks and
Corporate Control (Program in Law and Economics, School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley Working Paper No. 91-1, 1991).
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the maximum number of shares a single shareholder can vote.7° While
the Statute for a European Company does not itself erect barriers to con-
trol transfer, by its terms and limited application it allows those Commu-
nity members with corporate governance systems following the German
model to retain them.
The first step in understanding this harmonization effort from an eco-
logical perspective is to recognize that its most important characteristic is
not a preference for the British or the German model, but an orientation
towards replicating one or a combination of existing systems. If the criti-
cal characteristic of the ecological system in which EC companies will
compete in the future is constant and pervasive change, then the orienta-
tion of the harmonization effort must be forward-looking. This, in turn,
suggests an ecological approach to harmonization premised on the muta-
bility principle. While this is not the place to work out the details of such
an approach, I will show that the mutability principle provides a premise
on which one could be built. In particular, the mutability principle coun-
sels in favor of a distinction between technical and structural barriers to
takeovers and counsels against a distinction between technical barriers
created before and after a bid is made. Less conceptually, the mutability
principle also provides a means to distinguish between two types of
deviation from the principle of one share-one vote, namely dual class
common stock, in which one class has superior voting rights, and capped
voting, in which a cap is set on the maximum number of votes that can
be cast by a shareholder, regardless of the number of shares owned.
A. An Ecological Perspective on Harmonization of Takeover Law:
Choosing the Mutability Principle, Not the British or German
Approaches
The one clear element of the current effort to harmonize European
takeovers is that the task is perceived to be selecting the "correct" take-
over regime for member state corporations from among a short list of
historically delimited possibilities. This ordinarily involves a choice be-
tween the British model, the German model, or some amalgam of the
two, such as the combination of the Thirteenth Directive (which reflects
the British model for post-bid defensive tactics) and the Statute for a
European Company (which reflects the German model for pre-bid tac-
tics). For example, the BoozeAllen report to the Commission states:
"We believe the Commission should attempt to develop a 'European
Model' for takeovers with the aim of combining the best of both the UK
(or U.S.) and the West German (or Japanese) models."71 But the central
70. See, e.g., 2 Coopers & Lybrand, Barriers to Takeovers in the European Commu-
nity, Germany ch. (1990) (study commissioned by Great Britain Department of Trade
and Industry); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A
Study of France, Germany and the UK, 10 Econ. Pol'y 189 (1990).
71. BoozeAllen, supra note 64, at 56. Franks & Mayer criticize the Commission's
preference for the British model, but nonetheless treat the choice as limited to two candi-
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insight of an ecological perspective is that the dominant characteristic of
ecological systems is constant and pervasive change. There is simply no
reason to believe that the post-war success of the British or German (or
the Japanese or American) models in those countries assures their suc-
cess in a future in which internationalization proceeds at an ever-increas-
ing rate, product markets change with unprecedented rapidity, and the
explosion in information technology provides an ever more effective lu-
bricant for the entire process. Indeed, there is simply no reason to be-
lieve that we are capable of designing a fool-proof model. A healthy
respect for hubris dictates substantial skepticism of our ability to antici-
pate the shape of, and the proper response to, future change. And, as
Buxbaum and Hopt have stressed, the "petrification" of directives makes
the costs of being wrong high indeed.72 Once in place, directives are un-
likely to be changed.
In addition to treating the task as one of choosing between the British
and German models, the current approach to harmonization also seems
to build on a second, equally debatable, simplifying premise. It assumes
that limiting the choice to one or another model not only imposes con-
formity both geographically across the European Community and, given
the likelihood of petrification, across time, but also assumes that all firms
are the same and imposes conformity across types of firms. Emerging
empirical research suggests that different economic activities may be best
carried out in different organizational forms. For example, cutting edge
research and development may be better suited to small entrepreneurial
firms, while implementation of such efforts may be best suited to large
mature organizations.73 Firms that make substantial investments in re-
search and development are dramatically different from firms that are
not research and development intensive.74 Similarly, firms that seek pro-
tection from takeover by means of a management buyout appear to be
dates: "[T]here can be no presumption that the UK takeover market is superior to the
bank-dominated capital market of Germany." Franks & Mayer, supra note 70, at 194.
72. Buxbaum & Hopt, supra note 61, at 243.
Because Community directives require a long process of negotiation and com-
promise, there is a great danger that once a directive is enacted it will be practi-
cally impossible to amend or rescind. Any modification or repeal of a
Community measure would certainly not be easier than its enactment. On the
contrary, modifications of existing directives would receive little priority in rela-
tion to further harmonization proposals, and would probably even be opposed
as adverse to the harmonization process in general.
Id
73. See George J. Benston, Conglomerate Mergers: Causes, Consequences, and
Remedies 19-26 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies 198-207 (1975);
Ronald N. Yeaple, Are Small R&D Organizations More Productive? (Center for Manu-
facturing & Operations Management, Simon Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, University of Rochester Working Paper No. CMOM 87-04 1987).
74. See Bronwyn H. Hall, The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Re-
search and Development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - Microeconomics
1990, at 85; Bronwyn H. Hall, Corporate Restructuring and Investment Horizons (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3794, 1991).
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
qualitatively different from those who seek protection by means of issu-
ing a second class of super-voting stock to a control group.75 Precisely
because economic change may affect each firm differently, harmonization
efforts should accommodate variations among firms and activities. 6
That leaves us with mutability as a principle on which to premise the
harmonization effort. When the only condition of the future we can pre-
dict with confidence is pervasive change, and when such change can be
expected to affect different firms and industries differently, examining
existing regulatory regimes for barriers that serve to impede a firm's abil-
ity to respond quickly and effectively to technological change is our only
effective strategy. From this perspective, efforts at harmonizing Euro-
pean takeover law should seek to minimize barriers that impede the
transmission of economic change to the firm and barriers to organiza-
tional mutability, rather than selecting, at the supranational level, a sin-
gle regime to apply to all firms.
B. Implications of the Mutability Principle: Distinguishing Between
Technical and Structural Barriers to Takeovers
In discussing barriers to takeovers within the European Community, it
has become commonplace to distinguish between technical and struc-
tural barriers. 7" Technical barriers are part of the formal apparatus of
the corporate governance environment. They are erected by statutes and
statutorily authorized company regulations that allocate power between
various participants in the business enterprise, such as shareholders,
management, labor and, in some member states, the national govern-
ment. In addition to the familiar panoply of defenses erected by a target
company after receipt of a bid, and addressed by the Thirteenth Direc-
tive, the company laws of many member states also authorize a range of
75. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807 (1987); Kenneth Lehn et al., Consolidating Corporate
Controb Dual-Class Recapitalizations Versus Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 557
(1990).
76. Franks & Mayer make a similar point. Stressing the different characteristics of
the British and German models, the authors note that "[w]here the balance [between
models] lies will depend on the circumstances of individual firms and economies. Fast
growing firms will opt for arrangements that promote dynamic over static efficiency.
More mature firms will emphasize the advantage of corporate efficiency." Franks &
Mayer, supra note 70, at 215.
77. See Booz*Allen, supra note 64; Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70; Simon Mae-
Lachlan & William Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-Practicability, Dis-
closure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 Int'l Law. 373 (1989); The Regulations
Governing Mergers & Acquisitions Across the European Community, Int'l Fin. L. Rev.
(Josephine Carr ed., Supp. March, 1989); Section on Business Law, International Bar
Ass'n for Int'l Capital Markets Group, Constraints on Cross Border Takeovers and Merg-
ers--A Catalogue of Disharmony, 19 Int'l Bus. Law. 49 (1991); Benito Arrunada, Market
vs. Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: Interactions between Takeovers and
Industrial Policy in Spain (Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School Dis-
cussion Paper No. 66, 1989). Some authors have characterized the distinction as one
between regulatory and institutional barriers. See Franks & Mayer, supra note 70, at 192.
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techniques that effectively discourage a bid from being made in the first
place. For example, voting rights can be manipulated to provide protec-
tion. In a number of countries, company regulations can specify the
maximum number of votes that can be cast by a single shareholder.'
Similarly, in some countries different classes of shares can be given differ-
ent numbers of votes per share, thereby allowing voting control to be
placed in the hands of a select group regardless of the size of their equity
holdings. 9
Management organization also creates technical barriers to takeovers.
In Germany, the company's operations are placed in the hands of a man-
aging board appointed for a five-year term by a supervisory board com-
posed of up to 50% labor representatives, whose members can be
removed only by a 75% vote of shareholders.80 Thus, operating manage-
ment is protected against displacement by an acquiror for up to five years
following acquisition of voting control. At the extreme, the supervisory
board of public limited companies in the Netherlands are apparently self-
perpetuating, allowing shareholders the right to make suggestions as to
new supervisory board members, but with the power of actual selection
remaining with the supervisory board itself.8"
Finally, rules governing shareholder voting procedure serve to restrict
challenges to management through the electoral process. In Germany,
for example, the pervasiveness of bearer shares which shift voting power
to the depositories in which they are held, and the barriers to a beneficial
owner actually voting bearer shares lodged with a depository or directing
the depository how to vote, appear to make it impossible to wage a
United States style proxy fight.82
Structural barriers, in contrast, simply reflect the effect of existing con-
ditions in the economic environment, albeit facilitated and reinforced by
conditions in the corporate governance and political environments. They
78. See, eg., 2 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70 (reviewing voting restrictions on a
country by country basis).
79. In the Netherlands, for example, "protective" shares representing up to 50% of
outstanding stock can be issued to a friendly foundation when danger of a takeover is
present. See J.M.M. Maeijer, Dutch Law Relating to Hostile Takeovers and the Protection
Against Them, in Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers in the Common Market
173, 182-83 (J.M.M. Maeijer & Koen Geens eds., 1990).
80. Franks & Mayer, supra note 70, at 206.
81. 2 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 65, Netherlands ch. at 29, 37-38 (1989). This
governance structure also has a correspondent in the United States-the standard gov-
ernance structure used by non-profit corporations. "In the typical [U.S.] nonprofit corpo-
ration, members of the board of directors are elected by the corporation's voting members
who, in turn, are defined as the members of the board." Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to
Whom?, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 121, 122 (1990). However, U.S. law recognizes the
absence of any organizational constraint on management behavior, and typically subjects
the conduct of non-profit corporations to ongoing scrutiny by the state attorney general.
See id. at 122-23.
82. See Johannes Kondgen, Duties of Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock 3-7 (paper
presented at Conference on Comparative Corporate Governance, University of Osna-
bruck, July, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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include such circumstances as the concentration of ownership in families
and small groups, the influence of large universal banks, and the reliance
on debt as opposed to equity financing.
The mutability principle suggests a critical difference between techni-
cal and structural barriers to takeovers. An ecological perspective on
harmonizing takeover law has as its focus the interaction between the
economic, corporate governance and political environments. Corporate
acquisitions generally, and hostile takeovers in particular, function as a
mechanism by which the efficient boundary of the firm equilibrates fol-
lowing a technological change. Technical barriers raise the transaction
costs of the equilibration process, thereby ossifying the existing bounda-
ries of firms and protecting them from the need to respond to a changed
economic environment.
Structural barriers, in contrast, lack such an instrumental purpose. It-
aly provides a good example. It is reported that of the 200 Italian com-
panies listed on a stock exchange, only seven have more than 50% of
their common stock in the hands of the public. Of these, five are effec-
tively controlled by families. Thus, even in the absence of technical bar-
riers, only two companies in the entire Italian economy are even
theoretically subject to a hostile takeover.8 3 Such concentration is facili-
tated by a much heavier emphasis on debt, as opposed to equity, financ-
ing in continental Europe than in either the United States or Great
Britain. For example, stock market capitalization as a percentage of
gross domestic product was 98.1% in the United Kingdom, but no more
than 20% in France, Germany or Italy.84 The relative importance of
bank financing thus helps explain both the importance of banks in the
German corporate governance environment and the continued concen-
tration of equity holdings.
Concentrated patterns of ownership represent not a barrier to equili-
bration, but simply the existing condition of the economic environment.
Just as the peculiar history of the American economic and political envi-
83. 2 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70, Italy ch. at 12-14. The phenomenon of
extensive family control of public companies appears to be widespread. The Coopers &
Lybrand report estimates that over half of the 200 largest French companies are family
controlled. These holdings, together with government holdings in newly privatized com-
panies, protect a substantial portion of the French economy. See id., France ch. at 15.
Extreme concentration of family ownership is also reported in Spain. In Germany, only
465 public limited liability companies have their shares quoted on a stock exchange and,
of these, a large number are said to be part of a group. See Marcus Lutter & Brigitte
Lammers, Hostile Takeovers: Possibilities and Limitations According to German Law, in
Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers, supra note 79, at 113. Cable, supra note
64, provides more detailed data. One family held a majority of the stock of 14 of the top
100 German companies, and between 25-50% of an additional four companies. Because
large individual and family holdings increase as firm size decreases, and because of the
frequency of large corporate cross holdings, Cable believed that the data on family own-
ership of the 100 largest companies understated the extent of concentrated holdings in
German corporations. See id. at 120-21.
84. 2 Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70, France ch. at 12.
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ronments led to an emphasis on local banking and dispersed and now
reaggregating shareholdings, 85 so the economic and political environ-
ments of European Community member states other than Great Britain,
led to bank-dominated finance. Similarly, the pervasiveness of concen-
trated family ownership, especially with respect to successful first-genera-
tion companies founded following World War II, reflect a member state's
pattern of economic growth and the life cycle of the particular company.
These conditions will change in response to changes in the economic en-
vironment. As founders of significant numbers of post-war family com-
panies reach retirement age concentration of ownership will dissipate. In
fact, the weakening of the dominant position of the German banks may
already have begun. The development of international capital markets
has provided an alternative source of funds with a resulting decrease in
the percentage of the capital of large German corporations provided by
bank credits and loans-from 16.9% in 1974 to 6.6% in 1984.86 There is
85. For a discussion of American banking regulation, see Coffee, supra note 44;
Grundfest, supra note 44; Roe, supra note 44.
86. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1304, n.108 (1991); Josef Esser, Bank Power
in West Germany Revised, 13 W. Eur. Pol. 17, 23 (1990). Further evidence of change in
the German bank centered system is reflected in the drop in bank equity holdings that
parallels the drop in lending. From 1976 to 1986, the percentage of German companies
in which the large banks held in the aggregate more than 10% of the equity dropped from
129 to 86. See Esser, supra, at 25.
A similar process appears to be underway in Japan, the other system typically grouped
with Germany as bank centered. Carl Kester identifies three phenomena that have dra-
matically reduced the centrality of bank finance in the Japanese system. See W. Carl
Kester, Japanese Takeovers 187-217 (1991). First, as in Germany, the internationaliza-
tion of the Japanese capital market and the development of a commercial paper market
provided alternatives to traditional bank finances. See id. at 188. By 1985, some one-half
of Japanese company securities issuances were overseas. See id. Second, the success of
Japanese companies in the international marketplace resulted in an enormous buildup of
internal financial resources. The period from 1978 to 1987 marked a significant delever-
aging of Japanese companies, the net debt-to-equity ratio falling from 1.7 in 1978 to
slightly negative by 1987. See id at 191-93. Third, Kester reports a sharp drop in the
equity holdings of main banks in their client companies. The six largest banks hold less
than the 5% legal maximum in their keiretsu companies, and the trend is steadily down,
on average falling from 4.4% in 1975 to 3.7% in 1986. See id. at 207.
The result of these three phenomena suggest a significant change in the level of bank
monitoring in Japan-that characteristic commonly treated as the distinguishing feature
of Japanese corporate governance. Kester reports that all but one of the companies in his
sample stated that their corporate plans and investments were closely examined by their
banks during the 1950 to 1980 period, but that "none reported being subjected to such
scrutiny today." Id. at 197. Kester concludes that Japanese financial institutions "are
losing their ability to monitor client companies closely and intervene as needed to correct
problems, both heretofore critical safeguards in the Japanese corporate governance sys-
tem." Id. at 217. Other commentators confirm the phenomenon. See James C. Abeg-
glen et al., The Japanese Corporation 189 (1985); J. Mark Ramsayer, Legal Rules in
Repeated Dealt- Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. Legal Stud. 91, 98
(1991); Paul Sheard, Japanese Corporate Finance and Behavior. Recent Developments and
the Impact of Deregulation, in Japanese Financial Markets and the Role of the Yen 55, 62
(Colin R. McKenzie & Michael Stutchbury eds., forthcoming 1992). The pattern reflects
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little reason to pursue harmonization of the European economic
environment.
Recognition that so-called structural barriers are an outcome rather
than a cause serves to highlight the ecological importance of technical
barriers in the corporate governance environment. Technical barriers
perpetuate preexisting outcomes in the economic environment when
change otherwise would have shifted the efficient boundary of the firm.
Thus, the focus of any effort at harmonization of takeover law should be
on technical barriers that insulate a firm from the pressure to adapt to
technological change. Once the firm is left exposed to technological
changes, the existing equilibrium in the economic environment will shift
when such change warrants it.
C. Implications of the Mutability Principle: Eliminating the
Distinction Between Pre-Bid and Post-Bid Technical Barriers
Current harmonization efforts draw a sharp distinction between pre-
bid and post-bid technical barriers. The Thirteenth Directive's prohibi-
tion of defensive tactics in response to a bid would effectively dismantle
post-bid technical barriers. The proposed Statute for a European Com-
pany, however, would leave pre-bid technical barriers, like management
structure and share voting restrictions, largely in place. This distinction
is understandable from an historical perspective. It merely reflects the
familiar difference between company law and takeover law. s7 Applica-
tion of the mutability principle, however, renders this distinction irrele-
vant. Focusing only on post-bid technical barriers would leave
companies free to adopt governance devices that effectively block a hos-
tile offer from ever being made and thereby insulate the firm from the
pressure of changes in the economic environment, unless transmitted
through internal, voluntary mechanisms. The lesson of the American
experience in the 1980s, however, indicates that internal monitoring has
predictable limitations. It is effective when a particular company un-
derperforms within its respective industry. A ready performance mea-
sure-comparison with competitors-signals the need for action as well
as the specific type of action required. Such action, while distasteful,
does not require a reconceptualization of the company's very purpose. In
contrast, hostile takeovers seemed necessary when technological change
affected an entire industry. Insiders simply had more difficulty making a
paradigm shift.
the argument in this Essay-change in the economic environment engenders change in
the corporate governance environment.
87. It is the bid that triggers the operation of takeover regulatory regimes like the
City Code in Great Britain and the Williams Act in the United States. Even the common
law of corporations draws a parallel distinction between defensive responses and pre-bid
structural devices. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court treated the adoption of a
poison pill plan as an event of little moment, reserving careful scrutiny for the post-offer
decision as to whether to redeem the pill. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985).
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It is precisely when internal monitoring is least likely to work that pre-
bid technical barriers to external change will be invoked. Both existing
management and current workers may have a short-term interest in pre-
serving the status quo; resisting change gets some participants to retire-
ment and, in all events, puts off the day of reckoning for all. 8 But the
effect is only to shift the costs of change to the future and, most likely, to
increase them.
Thus, the mutability principle suggests eliminating the technical barri-
ers to change represented by the pre-offer obstacles that the Thirteenth
Directive does not address. This does not mean, however, that all re-
strictive management or voting arrangements should be eliminated. The
critical element required by the mutability principle is that the effects of
economic change be visited on those who have the power to cause the
organization to adapt. Technical barriers that nonetheless leave deci-
sionmakers exposed to the changing economic environment do not offend
the mutability principle.
This distinction can be illustrated by the difference between a dual
class voting arrangement in a company going public for the first time and
a system of capped voting. The former involves a company's initial pub-
lic offering with the dominant shareholder assuring continued control by
offering to the public only low-voting or non-voting stock. 9 The latter
involves placing a limit on the maximum number of votes that can be
cast by a single shareholder, regardless of the number of shares actually
owned. From the perspective of mutability, the two arrangements have
quite opposite implications. The dual class voting arrangement on an
initial public offering is unobjectionable. An owner/decisionmaker-a
party that has both the decisionmaking authority to cause the firm to
respond to economic change and, because it also bears significant eco-
nomic risk, the incentive to act--existed before the dual class public of-
fering. Because an owner/decisionmaker remains after the initial
offering, the economic impact of change will continue to be visited on the
corporate decisionmaker and the mutability principle is unimpaired.
88. John Coffee has thoughtfully developed the potential for self-protective coalitions
of management and labor in the face of economic change. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unsta-
ble Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. LJ. 1495, 1523-28
(1990). The conduct of Eastern Airlines prior to its takeover by Continental provides an
extreme example of such a value reducing coalition. There the job protective interests of
management and the machinists union coincided in a particularly revealing way. The
machinists represented the baggage handlers who, because of prior contracts, earned dra-
matically more-perhaps three to four times-than the minimum wage that their jobs
would have commanded on the open market. From the baggage handlers' perspective,
delaying any change worked to their advantage because it prolonged the period during
which they would receive above market wages even at the expense of the airline's failure.
Indeed, because minimum wage jobs would always be available, delay was preferable to a
resolution that might have saved the airline. See Robert N. Ashcroft, The Death of East-
ern Airlines: A Catastrophic Failure of Negotiations (May, 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
89. See Gilson, supra note 75, at 827-29.
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Conversely, a capped voting arrangement has a very different impact.
Rather than attempting to retain control in an owner/decisionmaker, a
capped voting scheme functions to assure that no owner/decisionmaker
can exist. Control cannot be centralized in anyone. The result, and pre-
sumably the goal, is to assure that control rests with management while
shareholders bear the impact of economic change. From this perspec-
tive, imagine the German governance system if the current decrease in
the importance of bank lending continues90 with the predictable effect of
reducing bank influence, and capped voting schemes prevent anyone else
from accumulating an ownership position large enough to allow signifi-
cant monitoring. By separating decisionmaking authority from riskbear-
ing, capped voting serves to buffer the organization from the pressure to
adapt to economic change. Such a result violates the mutability
principle.
The proposed Statute for a European Company distinguishes between
dual class and capped voting regimes, but unfortunately appears to get it
backwards. Article 52(3) of the Statute prohibits dual class voting while
Article 92(3) authorizes capped voting.9' A simple application of the
mutability principle would dictate the reverse-prohibiting capped vot-
ing and authorizing dual class voting.92
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE MUTABILITY PRINCIPLE
While one can imagine a number of objections to a mutability-based
approach to harmonization, two in particular warrant consideration
here. The first asserts that, in the end, harmonization according to the
mutability principle results in no more than an unrestricted invitation to
hostile takeovers, what the President of the French Republic, Francois
Mitterand, has called "gangsterism and the law of the strongest," 93 and
the CEO of Deutsche Bank, A. Herrhausen, has referred to as the "blun-
ders of American capitalism."94 The second objection, which in many
respects is a particularization of the first, asserts the importance of what
is said to be a special cost of hostile takeovers-the destruction of im-
plicit contract regimes. While the core of this objection is the same as
the first-that the mutability principle leads to a corporate governance
environment dominated by hostile takeovers-it warrants independent
90. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
91. See Statute for a European Company, supra note 61, at Articles 52(3), 92(3).
92. The recent amendment to the Proposed Fifth Directive concerning the structure
of limited companies and the powers and obligations of their organs, supra note 58, is a
step in the right direction. Prior to the amendment, Article 33(2), like the proposed
Statute for a European Company, prohibited dual class voting but authorized capped
voting. The amendment continues the prohibition of dual class voting, but at least pro-
hibits capped voting. Presumably the Proposed Statute for a European Company will be
amended to conform to the amended proposed Fifth Directive.
93. Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (1990) (citing Le Monde, Feb. 14, 1989).
94. Id. (citing Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 23, 1988).
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attention because it has been raised explicitly in the harmonization
debate.95
A. Is the Mutability Principle Merely the British Model in Disguise?
A critic of the mutability principle might well conclude that the rheto-
ric of an ecological approach, while different from the standard argu-
ments in favor of the disciplining value of an active market for corporate
control, yields the same prescription: the British model of unlimited hos-
tile takeovers. The objection is understandable. It is easy to assume that
eliminating technical barriers to hostile takeovers inevitably results in a
corporate governance environment dominated by hostile takeovers.
The confusion results from mistaking a process for an outcome. In the
model developed in Section I, corporate acquisitions are an equilibrating
mechanism that shifts the efficient boundary of the firm in response to
technological change.96 A hostile takeover is a special type of acquisition
95. See Franks & Mayer, supra note 70. A third objection to the mutability principle
is much more general. Harmonization of company law, as opposed to capital market law,
is simply said to be of minimal importance. See Buxbaum & Hopt, supra note 61, at 196-
204; C. Timmerman, Methods and Tools for Integration, in European Business Law 130
(Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991). As a result, harmonization or takeover law and
the mutability principle are hardly worth the effort.
While a detailed response to an objection at this level of generality is far beyond the
scope of this Essay, a number of brief responses are possible, the last of which persuades
me of the wisdom of the effort. First, a race to the bottom argument for harmonization,
which has power in the United States because of the perverse effect of competition for
charters over terms concerning which managers and shareholders have different interests,
seems much less persuasive in Europe. Because of the general application in Europe of
the headquarters approach to designating which state's laws govern a corporation's inter-
nal affairs, as opposed to the state of incorporation approach dominant in the United
States, change in applicable law is more costly in Europe. See Buxbaum & Hopt, supra
note 61, at 226-28.
Second, the need for harmonization of takeover law has been urged as necessary to
assure a "level playing field"; it should not be possible for German firms to launch hostile
bids for British firms while British firms are blocked from responding in kind. See, eg.,
European Business Law, supra, at 375-78 (remarks of G. Fitchew). However, in the
absence of an economic justification for hostile takeovers, the reciprocity claim seems
much more of a political justification for harmonization. Cf Buxbaum & Hopt, supra
note 61, at 198 (arguing that harmonization is not necessarily a political decision). I have
no inclination to argue that the mutability principle is responsive to a political agenda for
harmonization.
I am persuaded, however, that there exists an economic justification for harmonization
of takeover law on the mutability principle. The point of the mutability principle is to
assure an economic system that can successfully cope with an environment of pervasive
change. In a world in which blocks of trading partners are important, the health of the
European economy is affected by the economic health of its individual components.
From this perspective, harmonization on the basis of the mutability principle is necessary
to capture a public good-prosperity-that the short term self interest of important local
political actors-management and labor-may otherwise dissipate. To be sure, one can
take issue with this justification for harmonization, but then the issue is simply whether
the mutability principle makes sense-precisely where we were before the argument that
harmonization was unimportant was raised.
96. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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necessary when the acquiring company and the target disagree over the
location of the new efficient boundary.97 Eliminating barriers to the op-
eration of the equilibrating mechanism does not cause hostile takeovers.
Technological change occasions corporate acquisitions and the empirical
evidence in the United States strongly suggests that only certain types of
technological change result in hostile takeovers. In particular, hostile
takeovers seem to be associated with changes affecting the structure of an
entire industry, where effective internal monitoring is made difficult both
by the absence of a strong signal of poor performance and the incentive
for those who stand to lose by the necessary restructuring to protect
themselves by forming coalitions.9"
Moreover, limits to hostile takeovers are more pervasive than either
the discussion of technical or structural barriers thus far has indicated.
As recent surveys of takeover barriers have stressed, 99 cultural differ-
ences also affect the incidence of hostile takeovers. Suppose that a fam-
ily-controlled company is confronted with a technological change, the
rational response to which is selling the business. Suppose further that
the culture of the country in which the company operates treats manage-
ment as owing equal obligations to shareholders, labor and the public. "
If the family owners have internalized that culture and if hostile take-
overs are costly, then the family will presumably accept a lower price to
sell the business to a "responsible" buyer with the price difference being
outweighed by the culturally-dictated nonpecuniary utility associated
with responsible ownership. If the buyer is privately held, or if the price
discount for social responsibility does not exceed the costs of a hostile
takeover of the new buyer, no hostile takeover will result, even if barriers
to takeovers are eliminated. Cultural and institutional characteristics of
individual member states will not disappear with the advent of harmoni-
zation. Put differently, the structure of organization in any country is
likely to be path dependent-to depend upon the conditions in the eco-
nomic and political environment at the time that technical barriers to
takeovers are removed. 10' Thus, whether harmonization that takes the
form of dismantling technical barriers to takeovers results in a significant
number of takeovers depends on the nature of the technological changes
97. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
98. See Coffee, supra note 44, at 1329-1336. A recent example comes to mind. Both
labor and management resisted efforts by Carl Icahn to take over USX. Icahn proposed
to spin off USX's oil operations from its steel operations, claiming that the market penal-
ized the firm's conglomerate structure. The steelworkers union joined management in
opposing Icahn's effort because the assets of the oil operations provided valuable security
for the steelworkers' otherwise unfunded pension benefits. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Inyes-
tors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 905 n.146 (1991).
99. See, e.g., Booz*Allen, supra note 64; Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70.
100. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 70, Netherlands ch. at 29-30.
101. See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Identifying the Hand of Past: Distinguishing State
Dependence from Heterogeneity, 81 Am. Econ. Rev., May, 1991, at 75 (Papers &
Proceedings).
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and the particular institutions and economies of the respective countries.
This is precisely the difference between harmonization premised on the
mutability principle and harmonization premised on a selection from
among a limited number of existing models. The former seeks uniform-
ity in process; the latter seeks uniformity in outcome.
B. Hostile Takeovers as a Threat to Implicit Contract Regimes
A recent argument raised against hostile takeovers treats them as op-
portunistic breaches of implicit contracts between the corporation and
workers. 10 2 Because the terms of such implicit contracts, namely con-
tinuity of employment, cannot be specified explicitly except at great ex-
pense and with loss of flexibility, a corporate governance environment
that facilitates takeovers deprives companies of the benefit of this type of
contracting. In the context of the harmonization debate, Franks and
Mayer argue that the balance between the disciplinary benefits of hostile
takeovers and their costs in disrupting implicit contracting is indetermi-
nant, therefore leaving unclear the desirability of harmonization along
either the British or German models. 0 3 The implicit contract argument
against takeovers and harmonization can be approached both analyti-
cally and empirically. Evaluation of the analytic component of the argu-
ment is at best indeterminant because the terms of the implicit contract
of interest with respect to hostile takeovers are unobservable. Evaluation
of the empirical component of the argument, however, suggests that hos-
tile takeovers either do not play a significant role in situations where im-
plicit contracts are important, or that they are not breached by acquirors
in situations where they are important.
Labor economists originally developed the concept of implicit contract
to explain observed anomalies in the labor market, principally the down-
ward inflexibility of wage rates."° In this literature, voluntary relations,
the terms of which are not governed by a detailed written document, are
called implicit contracts. The simple intuition is that the terms of the
bargain are reflected implicitly in the substance of the continuing volun-
tary interaction between the parties. The difficulty with the application
of implicit contract analysis in the context of hostile takeovers, in con-
trast to its original application, is that the terms of the implicit contract
cannot be specified beyond those which are observed. In the hostile take-
over context, the particular term of the contract, which is crucial to the
argument, simply cannot be observed.
102. See Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes Shark Repellent and Hostile
Tender Offers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 155 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers,
Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences
33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
103. See Franks & Mayer, supra note 70.
104. See Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. Econ. Literature 1144
(1985). Rosen credits Costas Azariadis, Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equi-
libria, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 1183 (1975), with coining the term. See id at 1144.
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For example, imagine a claim that American companies have an im-
plicit contract with employees providing in general for long-term em-
ployment. The contract claim is based on the observation that, despite
the legal doctrine of employment at will,105 employees without explicit
contracts typically experience long-term employment with a single em-
ployer.106 What, however, is the implicit contract concerning employer
response to technological change? Have we observed long-term employ-
ment in the United States during the post-World War II period because
the implicit contract provides for continued employment despite techno-
logical change, or have we observed long-term employment even though
the implicit contract allows for discharge in response to technological
change, because there has been little technological change in basic indus-
tries? Thus, because we cannot observe the critical term of the implicit
contract, we also cannot determine whether a takeover that alters em-
ployment levels violates an implicit contract.10 7
The empirical component of the implicit contract argument fares even
worse. If takeovers serve to breach implicit contracts with labor, we
should observe either wage cuts or employment reductions following
takeovers. With respect to wage cuts, Shleifer and Summers0 8 report
"one famous case" -- Carl Icahn's acquisition of TWA-in which wage
105. The employment-at-will doctrine specifies that, in the absence of an explicit em-
ployment contract, an employee can be terminated at any time without cause. See, e.g.,
Andrew D. Hill, "Wrongful Discharge" and the Derogation of the At-Will Employment
Doctrine (University of Pennsylvania Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 31,
1987) (discussing abrogation of traditional employment at will doctrine).
106. See Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 Am.
Econ. Rev. 716 (1982).
107. Consider the following example. Prior to deregulation, an implicit contract ex-
isted between United States airlines and their unions that wage increases would not be
seriously contested because their cost could be passed on to consumers through CAB
approved fare increases. Deregulation changed that world. New non-union airlines en-
tered the market with lower labor costs and charged correspondingly lower fares. The
wage structures of established airlines put them at a significant competitive disadvantage.
What did the pre-deregulation implicit contract say about the airlines' right to make post-
deregulation changes in the wage structure by, for example, moving to a two-tier wage
structure? In such circumstances, implicit contract analysis cannot be very helpful. For
an interesting case study in the labor relations of airline deregulation, see Ashcroft, supra
note 85; see also Stacey Kole et al., Deregulation and the Governance of Airlines (Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Working Paper, April, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (presenting a careful study of how deregulation, by increasing
the consequences of managerial decisions for firm value, affected the governance of air-
lines).
One might still argue that, as a matter of public policy, workers (or others) should be
protected from unexpected changes in regulation or technology. For example, one might
argue that an appropriate response to a Kaldor-Hicks efficient change is to enforce the
hypothetical payment to losers. But then the argument is no longer one of implicit con-
tract, but of transition. Louis Kaplow convincingly argues that transitional relief-pro-
tecting individuals from the effects of changes in regulatory policy or economic
conditions-is generally inefficient. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transition, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 511 (1986).
108. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 102, at 35.
109. Bhagat et al., supra note 13, at 6.
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reductions loomed large. However, Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, after
considering a sample of hostile takeovers, conclude that compensation
cuts of existing workers are not a significant motivation for takeovers. 110
With respect to employment reductions, the data suggest little in the way
of reduction in blue collar employment. Some reduction in white collar
employment does appear, but even this result is associated with acquisi-
tions generally, rather than hostile acquisitions in particular. 11' Finally,
a recent study of 286 plant closings between 1980 and 1984 reported that
"few of the plant-closing announcements in our sample were made by
firms that were targets of takeovers attempts."'"1 2
From an ecological perspective, this result is hardly surprising. Recall
that the nature of the change in the economic environment influences the
acquisition technique observed in the corporate governance environment.
An acquiror has no incentive to alter implicit contracts that remain effi-
cient. If a hostile takeover really would dissipate a valuable corporate
asset, namely trust and reputation, why would an acquiror pay more for
the target after the loss of this asset than the target was valued by the
market in the hands of previous management? In settings where a hostile
takeover would somehow unavoidably destroy important implicit con-
tracts, we would expect to see only friendly transactions.
Thus, harmonization premised on the mutability principle should not
threaten existing implicit contract regimes. Again, the flaw in the argu-
ment is to confuse the availability of one aspect of an equilibrating pro-
cess with the outcome of that process. There is no reason to believe that
the availability of hostile takeovers would lead to their dominating the
European corporate governance environment.
CONCLUSION
A careful reader will have noticed that my argument supporting the
mutability principle as a basis on which to structure harmonization of
European takeover law suffers from an important ecological defect. In
developing the concept of the political ecology of takeovers, I described
the interaction of three environments: economic, corporate governance
and political. And while I considered the political environment in
110. See id.
111. See id. at 7. Bhide, supra note 13, at 48, finds that the redistribution effects of
hostile takeovers "borders on the trivial." Indeed, Lichtenberg & Siegel report an in-
crease in blue collar employment following takeovers, somewhat reversing a pre-takeover
decline. See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Seigel, The Effect of Ownership Changes on
the Employment and Wages of Central Office and Other Personnel, 33 J.L & Econ. 383,
387 (1990); see also Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating
Performance and Value, 24 J. Fin. Econ. 217, 241 (1989) (reporting consistent results).
112. Donald W. Blackwell et al., Plant-Closing Decisions and the Market Value of the
Firm, 26 J. Fin. Econ. 277, 287 (1990). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Job Loss and
Takeovers, Address to the University of Toledo College of Law, Third Annual Collo-
quium on Corporate Law and Social Policy (Mar. 11, 1988) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (refuting connection between takeovers and job loss).
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describing the political ecology of takeovers in the United States, that
dimension of the analysis has been entirely absent from my discussion of
the application of the mutability principle to European harmonization, a
central flaw given the familiar comment that harmonization is largely a
political process about which economic arguments are as often rational-
izations as they are motives.' 1 3
Indeed, I expect the American observers of the intersection of the cor-
porate governance and political environments would justifiably question
the political feasibility of harmonizing American takeover law around
the mutability principle. The recent efforts of representatives of large
U.S. corporations to block Securities and Exchange Commission propos-
als to increase access to the proxy process is only the most recent effort to
protect existing management positions against economic change.11 4
My neglect of the European political environment in assessing ap-
proaches to harmonization stems from caution born of distance. As only
a foreign observer of the process, I am left to suggest the mode of analysis
and leave to others with institutional knowledge of the political dimen-
sion to determine its feasibility. While it is personally troubling that the
political environment might block harmonization around the mutability
principle in the United States, for present purposes, it is not analytically
disconcerting. That the United States does it badly is no reason for Eu-
rope to follow suit, as the current effort at harmonization itself
demonstrates.
113. See Fitchew, Political Choices in European Business Law, supra note 95, at 1.
114. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Pressed by Business Over S.E. C., N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1991, at D1. ("One of the nation's most powerful corporate interest groups, the Business
Roundtable, has been meeting with senior Administration officials to bypass the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission in trying to prevent new rules for corporate shareholder
battles.").
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